Abstract
Introduction
In an open multi-agent marketplace that is full of competitors, the objective of agents is to maximize their own chance of accomplishing a given goal. However, incomplete information in the environment often results in uncertainty, and increases the difficulties in defining and choosing an optimal strategy. It is therefore important for agents to maximize their personal utility and at the same time, protect themselves from potential fraud and deception.
In the current literature, most of the trust models provide mechanisms for agents to either identify the trustworthiness of other agents, or protect themselves against fraud and deception. On one hand, trust is seen as a mechanism to evaluate the agents' potential partners. This can be done in a number of dimensions, including the acquisition of another agent's reputation from other agents [10, 11] , its own experience [2] , or from a reputation management system [1] . On the other hand, risk is seen as a mechanism to maximize the utility, such as when agents concentrate on how they can reach the dominant bidding strategy equilibrium [7] by the amount of risk an agent is prepared to take.
Interestingly, the intimate relationship between trust and risk have been discussed by different works [5, 3] recently. Yet, little has been done to show how trust and risk can be incorporated within a single model to yield an outcome that is beneficial to the whole system. In an environment full of uncertainty, we believe that it is crucial to consider both trust and risk when agents perform any forms of businesses in an open market place. Therefore, we propose an integral model for buying and selling, which combines trust and risk. Our model is flexible in terms of helping agents decide who to trade with under different situations, which can vary from safe to risky situations.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows: In Section 2 and Section 3, we discuss the buying model and selling model, respectively. In Section 4, we present the simulation results. We then give a review of related works in Section 5, and the conclusions are laid out in Section 6.
Buying Model
Consider a typical scenario that agents are trying to buy a good from other agents in the marketplace. Let A 1 , . . . , A m be the set of agents who perform trading in the marketplace. An agent A i contextualized to buying a good g is denoted as B(A i , g) and an agent A j which has been contextualized to selling a good g is denoted as S(A j , g).
When the trading begins, the buying agent B(A i ) publicly announces its requested good g associated with the maximum pay amount, MC(g), to all agents in the marketplace. Once the buying agent B(A i ) received the offers from all interested selling agents, it calculates the net value of the good g for each individual. Let IB = {S(A j , offer(B (A i , g))) , . . . , S(A k , offer(B(A i , g)))} be the set of interested selling agents who submit offer price, offer(B (A i , g) ), to the buying agent B(A i ) for good g. In the buying agent B(A i )'s perspectives, the net value, NV(S(A j , g)), of good g provided by the selling agent S(A j ) is denoted as
The net value is used for agents to find out the difference between its proposed maximum pay amount and each individual offer price. The higher value of net value, the better bargain the buying agent can get. However, it is dangerous for buying agents to deal with the selling agent which provides the highest net value as it is suspicious that the selling agent may deceit the buying agent in a higher chance (uncertainty occurs). Therefore, the buying agents are required to consider the trustworthiness of the selling agents and their own personal risk attitude whilst deciding who to trade with in such uncertain trading environment.
Utility Function and Personal Risk Attitude
In order to make a decision of who to trade with, the utility function [8] is applied. The utility function of agent B(A i ) from [4] summarizes different types of personal risk attitude:
and the personal risk attitude of the buying agent B(A i ), which is given as:
According to Equation 2, the value of utility will be altered by the type of agents' personal risk attitude. We can observe that risk seeking agents will tend to expand the utility more than risk averse agents and the risk averse agents prefer to sacrifice some utilities to avoid entering risky situation.
Once the buying agent B(A i ) incorporates risk with utility, it then evaluate the trustworthiness of all interested selling agents, which leads us to the next section.
Expected Utility and Trust
In game theory, the usage of expected utility enables agents to estimate the probability of winning the game. Based on this nature, we incorporate the concept of expected utility with trust in open marketplace. Let EU(NV(S(A j , g))) be the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility [8] for buying agent B(A i ), which is modified as
where p is the probability and pen(B (A i , g) ) is the utility of the penalty if the buying agent B(A i ) fails the task. The advantage of considering the penalty is that there is a situation where agents will lose utility if they fail to make deals with other agents in particular time, i.e. agents trading in the stock market. We also consider that the probability, p, of winning the deal for the selling agent S(A j ) is actually reflected by its trustworthiness. Based on this, the trustworthiness of agent can be obtained by its reputation, R(S(A j )), in which satisfies R(S(A j )) ∈ [0, 1). In this case, we can obtain a general global reputation of selling agent S(A j ) based on all the transactions it conducted previously, which is given as
where denotes the total number of transactions r that the selling agent S(A j ) has conducted. By rewriting the expected utility from Equation 4, we get
As the reader expects, the probability of winning the deal for selling agents is now correlated to the reputation. Considerably, the more trustworthy a selling agent is, the higher chance it wins the deal when competing with a notso-trustworthy agent providing the same offer.
Deciding the Winner and Evaluating the Performance
In order to decide who to trade with among all interested selling agents, the buying agents are required to make a choice that satisfies their requirements: maximize the profit and protect against fraud and deception. Nevertheless, agents with different personal risk attitudes will make decision differently. The risk averse buying agents prefer to have more protection than the profit. Thus, they will always trade with the selling agent with the maximum expected utility among the reputable one only. The risk neutral buying agents take a balance between two requirements. As a result, they always trade with the selling agent with maximum expected utility. For the risk seeking agents, they only concentrate on the utility gained. Therefore, they always trade with the selling agent with the maximum utility regardless of their trustworthiness (which is set to be the constant value of 1 in our case). In other words, a very trustworthy agent and a deceitful agent will have a equal chance of winning the deal when trading with risk seeking agents, in which we can convert the Equation 6 for this particular type of agent as follows:
From the above equation, we observe that the trustworthiness of selling agents becomes insignificant when calculating the expected utility, EU(S (A j , g) ), with utility function, U(S (A j , g) ). Therefore, the value of expected utility of buying agent B(A i , g)) with regards to selling agent S(A j , g)) is the same as the utility at all time. To decide which selling agent wins the deal, the buying agents are required to select the selling agent with the highest expected utility among all interested selling agents, i.e.,
{p ∈ IB | ∀g ∈ IB, p = g, EU (p) > EU(g)} (8)
After the transaction is completed, the buying agent B(A i ) will evaluate the trustworthiness of selling agent S(A j ) in that transaction based on its satisfaction level. To do so, the buying agent B(A i ) updates the global reputation of the selling agent S(A j ) using Equation 6.
Selling Model
Consider a typical scenario that all agents received the request message from the buying agent B(A i ) for good g with the proposed maximum cost MC(g), the agents have to decide the offer price if they can provide the good g to the buying agent.
Let cost(g) be the cost for selling agent S(A j ) to produce the good g. The selling agent S(A j ) first calculates the profit rate, rate(B (A i , g) ), which used for setting up the offer price. This leads to the following: Definition 1 (Profit Rate) The profit rate, rate(B (A i , g) ), is an indication of the amount of profit that the selling agent S(A j ) should earn, by selling good g to the buying agent B(A i ), based on its reputation R(S(A j )) and its personal risk attitude RA(S(A j )). The profit rate is given as
where w 1 and w 2 denote the weight, in which satisfies w 1 + w 2 = 1. The advantage of the above is immediately obvious. The profit rate enables selling agents to adjust the offer price according to the degree of their own global reputation and personal risk attitude. In this sense, a not-sotrustworthy selling agent is able to cut down the offer price so as to attract the buying agent's attention and increase its chance of winning the deal.
Once the profit rate is set, the selling agent S(A j ) can derive the offer price, offer(B (A i , g) ), for good g to the buying agent B(A i ). A i , g )) = min(cost(g) · (1 + rate(B(A i , g)) ), MC(g)) (10) For Equation 11, the offer price for the selling agent S(A j ) must be set between the produce cost: cost(g) and the maximum cost: MC(g) that the buying agent B(A i ) will pay for the good g. The profit rate, however, will vary from different types of personal risk attitude and of course, the degree of trustworthiness.
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Empirical Results
Experiments have been carried out in order to verify the effectiveness and benefits of our proposed model. The first experiment results shows that the risk averse agents outperform the other two types as they have the highest number of bids and success rate.
Beside that, risk averse agents also have the best accepted rate (25%) among the others. Likewise, the risk neutral agents have the lowest accepted rate (14%) and risk neutral agents are in the middle with 21% of accepted rate. One of the main reasons is how agents calculate the profit rate (Equation 9). For risk averse agents, they tend to avoid risk (losing the deal) by cutting down the profit. Although they make less profit in each transaction, they can attract more buyers' attention so as to increase the chance of winning the deal in the future. Moreover, they can also create more opportunities to improve the global reputation. For risk seeking agents, they rather like to increase the profit rate. In this sense, they become less competitive against other agents. Thus, they appear to have the least accepted rate according to the histogram.
The second experiment shows how risk affect the changes of reputation. We can observe that the risk averse agents start with poor reputation, then they build up the reputation by sacrificing part of the profit due to the nature of personal risk attitude. In this sense, risk averse agents with poor reputation will have chance to build up the reputation.
Finally, we can observe that agents do have an even chance for different type of agents with different risk attitude and reputation to trade online. This finding contradicts the traditional trust models where agents only trade with those that are known to be trustworthy. Since agents now consider the risk in partner selection, therefore, an agent with a poor reputation can "trade in" part of its income to get the chance of dealing with other agent. Furthermore, this approach also improves the throughput of the system, as there is no redundant agent in the system. More details of the experimental results can be obtained from [6] .
Related Work
English et. al [3] provide an insight of the relationship between trust and risk, which mainly affect how we model trust and risk in this paper. There are two alternative views of the relationship between trust discussed in their work. One view concerns about how trustworthy should an agent be in order to be allowed to enter a trading situation which entails a level of risk. Another view concerns about how much risk are agents willing to accept by allowing other agents to enter a trading situation. However, authors only concentrate on the latter view as it seems more appropriate in global computing. In our work, we model both views of trust and risk relationship for agents to enrich the decision making process.
Xiong and Liu [9] proposed a trust model, which consider the trust related factors that affect the reputation of entity in the P2P system. In their model, trust parameters are interchangeable so as to suit different scenarios and to address and alleviate different problems such as free riding problem. However, authors do not take into the consideration of risk attitude. As we defined in this paper, risk is one of the important factor which affect the decision making process, especially in the open marketplace.
Conclusions
We consider software agents working in a open marketplace, in which they are required to protect themselves from fraud and deception. Towards this, our models enable agents to use trust and risk as tools to (i) evaluate the trustworthiness of potential agents, (ii) enhance the partner selection phrase, and (iii) adjust the offer price.
In view of the above, our buying and selling model provide agents an extensive protection against deceitful behaviour, and to avoid risky situations. With the personal risk attitude being explicit, agents are now more flexible in selecting their partners, and in adjusting the offer price according to their own personal risk attitude and global reputation. Furthermore, our model provides an even chance for different type of agents with different risk attitude and reputation to trade online. This is in contrast to other trust models where agents only trade with those that are known to be trustworthy.
From our initial simulation results, we believe we have evidence to support the feasibility of our proposal. Hence, our future work is to make further improvements to the existing buying and selling model.
